Weekly Eurasia Review – Week 39
Editorial Team
The most important developments from across Eurasia this week – selected news, analyses and broader trends.
Weekly Eurasia Review
Week 39
The most important developments from across Eurasia this week – selected news, analyses and broader trends.
1. News Map
Markets and Economy
In recent months, oil tankers belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet and subject to international sanctions have again become more frequent visitors to Tunisian ports, including Radès, La Skhira and La Goulette. Their presence suggests that Russia continues to use North African routes to circumvent sanctions on its oil exports.
Libya’s oil sector has been severely disrupted since 21 September, when an armed group responsible for protecting a valve on the pipeline connecting the Sharara oil field to the export port of Zawiya blockaded the facility over unpaid wages. The shutdown has caused substantial losses at Libya’s largest oil field. According to the National Oil Corporation (NOC), more than 720,000 barrels of production had been lost by 24 September, with direct losses exceeding $75 million. The shortage of crude forced one unit at Zawiya, the country’s second-largest refinery, to shut down, adding to Libya’s longstanding fuel and electricity supply problems. Since the 2011 civil war, rival political and armed groups have repeatedly used the closure of oil fields, pipelines and ports as a means of exerting political and economic pressure.
According to an announcement by US special envoy Sergio Gor, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will visit Uzbekistan in mid-October during the C5+1 foreign ministers’ meeting. The delegation may include executives from more than 100 US companies. Talks are expected to focus on regional economic connectivity and energy security.
During the general debate at the UN General Assembly, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov criticised unilateral sanctions and their impact on smaller developing countries. Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s presidential administration, called for an expansion of the UN Security Council and sought support for Uzbekistan’s bid for a non-permanent seat in 2035–2036. She also highlighted cooperation among Central Asian states and warned against viewing Afghanistan solely as a security threat.
More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports still reach international markets through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system, which crosses Russian territory. In 2025, the route carried 64.8 million tonnes of Kazakh oil, compared with 1.26 million tonnes shipped across the Caspian Sea for onward transport through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Higher demand linked to the conflict in the Middle East could create an opportunity for Kazakhstan, but disruptions to the CPC and the limited capacity of alternative routes constrain how much it can benefit.
During Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to Karakalpakstan, 11 facilities worth a combined $592 million were inaugurated, and construction was announced on 47 new projects with an estimated value of around $7 billion. Karakalpakstan is an autonomous republic of Uzbekistan in the Aral Sea region, where investment has particular significance given the severe environmental and economic consequences of the sea’s desiccation. The completed facilities include two wind farms with a combined capacity of 300 MW and a 100 MW energy storage facility. The largest of the newly announced investments is a planned 1.5 GW wind farm in Kungrad, developed with Saudi company ACWA, together with related grid upgrades. Its announced value is $2.6 billion. Data centres and digital currency projects worth around $2.3 billion are planned with Chinese partners, while work has also begun on a 92-kilometre section of the A-380 road.
Serbia’s Ministry of Mining and Energy has signed a contract with a consortium led by the Jaroslav Černi company to prepare a preliminary feasibility study, a general design and spatial planning documents for the Đerdap 3 pumped-storage hydropower plant. The project is currently estimated to cost around €2.6 billion, while preliminary plans envisage a capacity of up to 1,800 MW. The facility could help integrate renewable energy into the electricity system, but its final capacity, technical design and cost will be determined during further planning.
Italy’s Fintel Energia Group has entered into a strategic partnership with China’s Windey Energy Technology Group to develop its wind energy projects in Serbia. Under the agreement, Windey may invest directly in Fintel’s projects, either independently or alongside other Chinese institutional investors. The projects include the planned 854 MW Maestrale Ring wind farm.
According to Milutin Đukanović, chair of the board of Montenegro’s state-owned electricity company EPCG, the company will pay €75 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions to the Eco-Fund under national emissions trading rules. The previous price was €24. Đukanović said the new rate could cost the company around €70 million a year.
Domestic carbon pricing also matters in the context of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): a carbon price paid in the country of origin can be taken into account when calculating obligations associated with imports into the EU.
Fortis Energy and İnelso Energy Systems have signed a joint investment agreement for a 30 MWp solar farm and battery energy storage facility in Vojvodina. According to Fortis, the €25.5 million project is ready for construction, although its building permit has yet to be issued. The solar farm is expected to generate more than 40 GWh annually. Another Turkish company, Enkraft Energy, would be responsible for engineering, procurement and construction.
Foreign Policy, Security and Defence
Speaking at the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa stated that the Golan Heights remain Syrian territory and that, under UN resolutions, Syria considers decisions concerning their Israeli annexation invalid. He said Syria remains committed to the 1974 Israeli–Syrian agreement and demands Israel’s withdrawal from Syrian territory.
According to al-Sharaa, Israel has carried out around 500 air and artillery strikes and more than 1,200 incursions against Syria. Damascus rejects Israeli actions that, in its view, seek to change the situation unilaterally and establish a new reality in Syria.
New US sanctions targeting Iran’s aviation sector have taken effect. Alongside airlines, they affect companies providing fuel and ticketing services. The restrictions could reduce air traffic between Iran and several countries, including Iraq and Oman. According to Iran’s civil aviation authority, airports in Baghdad and Muscat are no longer accepting Iranian flights, while talks are under way to redirect some services to Najaf.
Iraq is expected to comply with the US restrictions, which could have a particular impact on religious tourism. Travel agencies are already exploring overland alternatives. Meanwhile, Georgia has halted Iranian flights altogether, and Mahan Air has suspended its services to Türkiye.
Following his address to the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told FOX News that Tehran was open to reducing uranium enrichment, diluting its existing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, and allowing international inspectors into the country.
His remarks drew sharp criticism from conservative political and military figures. They warned that another US attack could prompt Iran to expand the geographic scope of the conflict, potentially as far as the Indian Ocean. They also threatened retaliatory measures against countries in the region over restrictions affecting Iranian aircraft. The exchange highlights a domestic political divide: the president and his foreign minister favour a diplomatic solution, while hardliners and elements of the military leadership advocate a more confrontational approach.
On 24 September, 17 Kazakh soldiers were swept into open water during an exercise on the Caspian Sea after the weather suddenly deteriorated. Three were rescued; fourteen died. A national day of mourning was declared for 25 September, and an investigation was launched into the circumstances of the accident. Five military commanders were detained on suspicion of negligence and violations of navigation rules.
On 27 September, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev dismissed Defence Minister Dauren Kosanov and appointed Myrzakhmetov, a former commander of the special operations forces, in his place. Investigators have yet to establish what role, alongside the weather, the exercise’s preparation and compliance with safety rules played in the tragedy.
According to a 23 September ruling by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court, the 60-day deadline for electing a president expires on 6 October. If lawmakers fail to elect one by then, the constitution requires parliament to be dissolved, leading to another early election. The court also ruled that the election of the government on 13 September did not violate the constitution, but said parliament must elect its remaining deputy speaker as soon as possible.
On 24 September, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament set the presidential election for 27 January 2027. Candidate nominations are already open and will close on 13 November; the official campaign begins on 23 December. Incumbent President Sadyr Japarov is seeking another term. The political backdrop includes the collapse of the alliance between Japarov and his former ally Kamchybek Tashiev, as well as Tashiev’s conviction.
Humanitarian Situation
The war has created a severe housing crisis in the Gaza Strip. Many buildings have been destroyed, while others are so badly damaged that they are unsafe to inhabit. Even so, many families have no choice but to remain in damaged homes because they cannot afford to rent elsewhere, while a return to tent camps offers no real solution.
High rents, inadequate infrastructure, sewage and waste problems, and a lack of basic services make the situation worse. The consequences of the war extend beyond the destruction of buildings: they have created a lasting crisis in people’s housing and living conditions.
According to the Kurdistan Region’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre, 569,310 internally displaced Iraqis, comprising 114,690 families, currently live in the region. Around 83% of them, or 471,880 people, live outside camps in cities and towns, while 97,430 reside in 18 displacement camps.
Duhok Governorate hosts the largest number, around 286,000 people, followed by Erbil with 187,000 and Sulaymaniyah with approximately 96,000. Sulaymaniyah has no displacement camps. The regional government needs more than $850 million annually to provide basic support for displaced people and asylum seekers. The 2024 census, however, prompted a dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over which governorates should count people displaced to Kurdistan, a decision that also affects the level of budgetary support.
2. On the Radar
Analysis
In an analysis published by Le Monde, Frédéric Bobin argues that political participation is declining significantly across the Maghreb—Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia—as reflected in record-low turnout at recent parliamentary elections. Turnout in Morocco’s 23 September parliamentary election was just 38%, down 12 percentage points from 2021. In Algeria, only 20.8% of eligible voters cast a ballot in the 2 July parliamentary election, marking historically low participation. Tunisia has seen a similar trend: turnout in its most recent parliamentary election, in January 2023, fell to 11.4%, a sharp drop of 30.5 percentage points compared with 2019.
Authoritarian governments have accelerated this trend by sharply restricting, or eliminating, the space available to genuine opposition. In Morocco and Algeria, parties have in many cases become instruments of those in power or channels for distributing scarce state resources. In Tunisia, open autocracy and the complete delegitimisation of traditional parties have become central features of the political system.
A further problem is that formerly influential nationalist, left-wing and Islamist forces can no longer convey public demands effectively, so tensions increasingly emerge as open discontent. Bobin warns that deliberately weakening political parties is a dangerous strategy for governments: if they hollow out political representation entirely, they may lose the intermediaries capable of easing social tensions, leaving themselves vulnerable to sudden outbreaks of mass unrest.
About the Author
The Gefyra Team
Editorial Team
Collective editorial authorship by the Gefyra team.