Weekly Eurasia Review – Week 41
Editorial Team
The most important developments from across Eurasia this week – selected news, analyses and broader trends.
Weekly Eurasia Review
Week 41
The week’s key developments across Eurasia — selected news, analysis and context.
1. News Map
Markets and Economy
French companies operating in Libya are facing serious difficulties as the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) withholds payments for imports amid a currency and liquidity crisis. The CBL’s primary challenge is to address structural exchange-rate distortions: the substantial gap between the Libyan dinar’s official and black-market rates severely undermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. Although CBL Governor Naji Issa has announced a comprehensive stabilisation programme to improve foreign-exchange flows and curb inflation, his efforts are hampered by the country’s divided public finances and the fiscal policies of the eastern Libyan government based in Benghazi. As the situation became untenable, Issa submitted his resignation in August, but Abdulhamid Dbeibah, prime minister of the western Libyan government in Tripoli, rejected it in an effort to avert complete economic and political chaos.
Sungrow’s Italian subsidiary will install battery storage at Albania’s 185 MW Project Blue solar park. Under the agreement, the company will provide 130 MWh of storage capacity through 26 PowerTitan 2.0 units and 13 MVS3460-LS units. The company has already installed more than 1.1 TW of solar capacity worldwide.
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama received Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Mehmet Kemal Bozay at his office for talks on economic and energy cooperation. Representatives of the Türkiye–Albania Business Council and Albania’s Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, Enea Karakaçi, also attended the meeting.
Representatives of Kazakhstan’s government and trade unions adopted a declaration on the use of artificial intelligence in the workplace in Astana on 7 October. The document states that human decision-makers must be involved in decisions affecting workers’ rights and interests. Trade unions stressed that employers remain responsible for decisions supported by algorithms and that workers must be able to challenge those decisions and request human review.The declaration also envisages a cooperation forum and a system to monitor implementation of the commitments.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov signed an agreement in Avaza on 8 October to establish a high-level Strategic Partnership Council. The body is intended to deepen political dialogue and expand bilateral cooperation. The two sides also agreed to draw up an action plan to increase trade, alongside cooperation programmes in energy, transport, agriculture and water management.
The five Caspian littoral states agreed in Avaza on 9 October to establish a joint commission to address falling sea levels. Representatives of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan will investigate the causes and develop coordinated measures to mitigate the adverse effects of the decline. Governments have three months to appoint their representatives. The commission’s first meeting is planned for the first half of 2027 in Azerbaijan, with expert groups supporting its work.
Yerkin Tukumov, the Kazakh president’s special representative for Afghanistan, visited Herat in late September with a delegation of government officials and business representatives. The “West2West” initiative aims to build closer economic ties between Kazakhstan’s western regions and Afghanistan’s western provinces. During the visit, a 43-kilometre section of the Khaf–Herat railway was inaugurated, with Kazakhstan’s Integra Construction KZ having contributed to its construction. The expansion of economic cooperation is reflected in bilateral trade figures: trade reached $581.1 million in the first seven months of 2026, exceeding the total for the whole of the previous year.Exports from Kazakhstan to Afghanistan accounted for the overwhelming majority of this trade.
Kyrgyzstan’s public debt rose to $10.16 billion by the end of July 2026, equivalent to approximately 38 per cent of projected GDP for the year. External debt stood at around $5.19 billion, while domestic debt amounted to $4.96 billion. China remains the country’s largest foreign creditor, with approximately $1.4 billion in outstanding claims. The government plans to allocate a total of around $1.83 billion to external debt repayments and interest payments between 2027 and 2029. As a substantial share of these obligations must be paid in dollars, a weaker som could increase the burden on the budget.
Tajikistan’s Minister of Energy and Water Resources, Daler Juma, discussed the country’s fuel supplies with the chargé d’affaires of the US embassy on 8 October. The meeting followed Tajikistan’s decision to begin importing petroleum products from Iran. In the first nine months of the year, the country imported around 1.37 million tonnes of crude oil, petroleum products, liquefied gas and related goods, worth a total of $1.13 billion. Iranian supplies could help diversify sources of supply, but also carry risks because of US sanctions on Iran’s oil sector.
At its meeting in Avaza on 7 October, the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination agreed on water withdrawal limits for the Amu Darya and Syr Darya during the 2026–2027 autumn–winter season, as well as planned reservoir operating schedules. Publicly available reports do not specify the allocations for individual countries. Reconciling upstream countries’ winter electricity-generation needs with downstream countries’ summer irrigation requirements remains one of the region’s central water-management challenges. Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal could place additional pressure on the Amu Darya’s water resources.
Greece, Bulgaria and Romania have identified 25 priority transport projects to develop the network connecting the Aegean Sea, the Danube and the Black Sea. Their estimated combined cost is €22.8 billion. Some funding has already been secured, while the remaining projects require additional financing. Plans include railway upgrades, electrification of the Ruse–Giurgiu railway bridge and preparatory work for new Danube crossings. The three countries aim to accelerate cross-border development by coordinating their national investment programmes.
Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence
Mohamed Berrid, Chief of the General Staff of Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces, received Lieutenant General Issa Saif al-Mazrouei, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, in Rabat. The talks focused on developing defence capabilities, defence industries, training and the exchange of expertise. The UAE delegation’s visit followed Algeria’s decision on 10 September to sever diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi, citing regional tensions and hostile actions, and to close its airspace to Emirati aircraft.
Eight Israeli defence companies participated in the Marrakesh Air Show, held from 7 to 10 October, three of which already have contracts with Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces. Through this participation, Israel is seeking to strengthen its position in Morocco’s defence market, traditionally served by French and US defence companies. Alongside conventional aerospace products, the Israeli companies are showcasing integrated air defence, long-range precision-strike systems, unmanned platforms, network-centric combat systems and satellite capabilities. French authorities had previously excluded some of the same companies from Eurosatory in 2024 and the Paris Air Show in 2025.Although the official explanation was that the wars in Gaza and Lebanon made conditions unsuitable for their participation, market-protection considerations may also have played a role.
The Italian Navy handed over command of EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI to the Hellenic Navy last week.Launched after the 2020 Berlin Conference, the EU mission’s primary objective is to enforce the arms embargo in place since 2011 and prevent weapons from entering Libya. Despite the embargo, external actors continue to supply weapons to various Libyan militias. The operation, currently involving three Greek and two Italian warships, also contributes to curbing irregular migration through its maritime presence, aerial reconnaissance and satellite surveillance.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune are expected to meet in Madrid in late October. Although the exact date and agenda are still being finalised, the talks are expected to cover Algerian gas supplies to Spain, reaffirming a shared position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and Algeria’s mining potential. Preparations are taking place against the backdrop of tensions between Spain and Morocco and King Felipe VI’s planned visit to Ceuta and Melilla. Since the 2022 dispute over Western Sahara, efforts to restore diplomatic relations have rested on a mutual understanding that the two sides can agree to disagree on contentious issues.
Libya’s House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk in the east, has elected al-Salhin Abdulnabi as its new speaker after almost twelve years, replacing Aguila Saleh, who had held the position since 2014. Lawmakers also adopted a new system limiting the speaker and deputy speakers to a single 12-month term. Saleh’s removal signals an internal redistribution of power within the eastern camp, directly linked to US efforts to accelerate the unification of Libya’s political and military institutions. Although Saleh is an ally of Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), he has become an independent political actor in recent years. By replacing him, Haftar and his allies are seeking a more flexible but more tightly controlled political support structure, while adapting to external expectations. An agreement reached on 30 August through mediation by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) calls for parliamentary and presidential elections within two years, but the United States is pursuing a different strategy. The plan promoted by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser on Arab and African affairs, envisages a power-sharing arrangement under which Haftar’s son and deputy, Saddam Haftar, would replace Mohamed al-Menfi as head of the Presidential Council, while Abdulhamid Dbeibah would remain prime minister.
Two merchant vessels were struck by drone attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. The Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire; all 18 crew members of the latter vessel were rescued. Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the drone could be linked to either Ukraine or Russia, making a peaceful end to the war paramount. While describing the incident as a grave violation of international law, he also opposed convening the country’s national security council, as proposed by acting President Iliana Iotova. The opposition argues that the drone strike is clearly attributable to Moscow and that Radev’s policies fail to adequately defend the country’s interests.
According to remarks made in Tashkent by US Special Envoy Paolo Zampolli, Donald Trump would like to visit Uzbekistan, although no date has yet been set. Asia-Plus reports that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to attend the C5+1 meeting in Samarkand in mid-October, accompanied by a US business delegation expected to number around one hundred people.
Bulgaria will hold the first round of its presidential election on 25 October, with a second round on 1 November if required. The two leading contenders are incumbent Iliana Iotova and former caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov. Iotova stresses that Bulgaria should avoid direct involvement in the war in Ukraine, while Gyurov places the country’s European and Euro-Atlantic commitments at the centre of his campaign. Opinion polls in early October showed Iotova in the lead, but suggested that a second round would be necessary.
Humanitarian Overview
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented the arrest or detention of at least 52 women and one girl in Herat and Kabul between July and September. The detentions were linked to alleged violations of the Taliban authorities’ rules on dress and male accompaniment. Those detained were released after a few hours, but the mission also reported verbal abuse, beatings and threats. According to UNAMA, fear and social stigma may leave many incidents unreported.
Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) highlighted the difficulties facing nearly 6.5 million Afghans who have returned from Iran and Pakistan since 2023. In its survey, 69 per cent of respondents aged 14 or older had not worked in the thirty days preceding their interview, while 77 per cent of the returnees surveyed were living in temporary accommodation. Forty-three per cent of surveyed households lacked the documentation needed to access essential services. Sustainable reintegration requires livelihood opportunities, secure housing and access to basic services.
According to an IOM update on 11 October, at least 139 migrants died and another 84 remain missing after a boat bound for Yemen capsized off the coast of Djibouti. The vessel, carrying 305 people, sank north of Obock in the early hours of 9 October; around 82 people survived. Search and rescue operations are continuing, and the IOM is providing survivors with medical care, food, shelter and psychosocial support. The tragedy is one of the deadliest boat disasters on the Eastern Route linking the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. Djibouti receives both migrants travelling towards the Gulf states and people fleeing the fighting in Yemen. Since 10 September, more than 20,000 crossings from Ethiopia have been recorded, while over 3,700 refugees arrived from Yemen during roughly the same period.
2. On the Radar
Analysis
Amwaj Media’s analysis, “Violence Escalates in Iran’s Restive Southeast”, examines whether the recent surge in violence in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province marks the beginning of a new, more active phase of the Baloch armed separatist movement. It describes how attacks by Baloch militants on border guards in September and October have prompted the security forces to intensify their efforts to dismantle armed groups in Iran’s least-developed province.
The recent attacks have been attributed to the Popular Fighters’ Front (PFF), an armed coalition formed last December, whose longest-established member is Jaish al-Adl. The analysis suggests that the umbrella organisation may have been created to gain legitimacy as an Iranian opposition movement rather than merely a separatist group. This strategy is directly linked to the Iranian state’s traditionally limited ability to exert control in the province bordering Pakistan, where political tensions over separatism, ethnic divisions involving the Baloch population, and Sunni–Shia religious differences overlap.
The analysis emphasises that the geography of the Iran–Pakistan borderlands fundamentally shapes the region’s security environment. The mountainous, sparsely populated terrain provides armed groups with relative isolation, while a substantial share of their income comes from the region’s flourishing fuel and drug smuggling networks. Pakistan plays a crucial role: exploiting the porous border, Iranian and Pakistani Baloch armed groups find refuge on the other side, fuelling deep mistrust between Tehran and Islamabad.
The situation in Sistan and Baluchestan is also influenced by the wider Middle Eastern security environment, including increased Houthi activity in Yemen and the US–Israeli war against Iran. Escalating violence presents Tehran with a serious challenge: the government must contain the armed threat while avoiding a harsh security response that deepens local grievances. According to Amwaj Media’s analysis, although the Baloch militias’ conventional military capabilities and resources fall far short of those of Iran’s security forces, their capacity for asymmetric warfare remains a significant source of disruption. The qualitative shift in the conflict lies in the growing frequency and tactical diversification of attacks, rather than the prospect of outright victory by the armed groups.
In Focus
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the volume of international transfers of major arms increased by 9.2 per cent in 2021–2025 compared with the previous five-year period. The United States retained its leading position, accounting for 42 per cent of global exports. Its largest recipient was Saudi Arabia, which received 12 per cent of US deliveries. The other leading exporters were France, Russia, Germany and China. The destinations of these transfers illustrate the influence of strategic partnerships and wars: Pakistan received 61 per cent of China’s arms exports, India received 48 per cent of Russia’s, and Ukraine received 94 per cent of Poland’s. Ukraine became the world’s largest arms importer during the period under review. When interpreting the figures, it is essential to remember that SIPRI measures the volume of arms transfers, rather than their financial value. The figures include equipment provided as military aid as well as commercial purchases.
About the Author
The Gefyra Team
Editorial Team
Collective editorial authorship by the Gefyra team.